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ARGUMENT
INTRODUCTION
This case was decided on summary judgment.

On summary judg-

ment, plaintiffs were entitled to have the court view the evidence
and all reasonable inferences fairly to be drawn therefrom in the
light most favorable to them. Morris v. Farnsworth Motel, 123 Utah
289, 259 P.2d 297, 298 (1953).

Defendants place their own inter-

pretation on carefully selected and omitted facts, rather than
affording plaintiffs the presumption to which plaintiffs are
entitled.

Every citation to the record in plaintiffs' principal

Brief supports the fact asserted.1

Defendants' extensive and

•""The following is a short and incomplete list illustrating some of the areas
in which defendants simply ignore disputed facts and draw inferences in their own
favor instead:
a.
Defendants contend there is "absolutely no evidence" that Wiley, Quale
and Wood met to discuss the Wiley Firm's representation of Northstar on June 11,
1986.
(Appellees' Brief, at 36-37.)
The record unequivocally supports the fact
that the meeting occurred on that date.
(R. 4183, 4557, 6570, 6689, 7043.)
b.
Defendants claim Wood did not represent Northstar or plaintiffs in the
negotiations between plaintiffs and Northstar/Allstate or in reducing the venture
to writing.
(Appellees' Brief, at 36.)
Wood's time sheets show he provided
extensive services on behalf of plaintiffs in connection with such negotiations, and
he also represented Northstar.
(R. 4557-72, 5420-26, 6689-6752, 6683-6783, 685267.) His time sheets show he spent over 40 hours in representing plaintiffs during
the three-day squeezedown in mid-November 1986.
(R. 6773-75.)
c.
Defendants state that plaintiffs' assertion that "Wood knew they were
in a terrible position because they had to pay two million dollars . . . and had no
financing alternative available at the time [of the squeeze-down]" is false.
(Appellees' Brief, at 36.) Defendants then state that Wood testified that it was
plaintiffs' fault they were subject to a $2 million dollar liability under a buyout
agreement with another station applicant.
(1^.) Wood stated he knew plaintiffs
were in a terrible position.
(R. 5476-77.)
In addition, the record shows
plaintiffs first learned they were subject to personal liability during the midNovember squeezedown when Wood informed them, after he had negotiated the very
agreements that subjected plaintiffs to liability.
(R. 5099, 5159, 5025-26, 5159-

nevertheless selective recitation of facts simply underscores the
point that the material facts are in dispute.
In June 1986, defendants undertook representation of Northstar, a clear conflict of interest which plaintiffs did not waive.
This initial breach of defendants' duty set in motion a series of
events out of which plaintiffs' injuries proximately, naturally and
foreseeably flowed.

Defendants are silent concerning those June

1986 breaches. They attempt instead to focus the Court's attention
solely on subsequent events.

Defendants ignore completely the

factual question of whether the later events, on which they do

60, 5169-72, 5099, 5180-81, 5206-07.)
d.
Defendants claim plaintiffs falsely stated that the dispute between
Wood and the Wiley Firm following the November 1986 squeezedown "had nothing to do
with the firm's [conflict of interest] ."
(Appellees' Brief, at 34.)
That was
precisely a focus of the dispute. Wood discussed the ethical issues relating to the
conflict in detail in his memorandum to the Wiley Firm after the Firm had criticized
him for representing plaintiffs during the squeezedown.
(R. 6451-58, 6462-64, 647071.)
e.
Defendants claim plaintiffs have misled the Court by stating that
defendants represented Adams concerning the "possible purchase of Channel 13 and the
sale of Channel 20." Defendants attempt to minimize their representation of Adams
by stating that "Quale only spent a total of .50 hours in early 1986 on Adam's
matter."
(Appellees' Brief, at 34.)
Not only do defendants admit such
representation of Adams, but defendants' conflict record shows that when defendants
were asked to represent Adams in connection with Channel 13, the matter "should
appear as conflict."
(R. 6291-92.)
Moreover, through this representation,
defendants knew Adams was interested in purchasing Channel 13, a fact defendants
failed to disclose to their Utah clients, most likely because it would have impacted
on Northstar's ability to acquire the station.
(R. 4042-43, 5021-24.)
f.
Defendants claim plaintiffs falsely stated that Allstate was a client
of the Wiley Firm in the summer of 1986.
(Appellees' Brief, at 34.) Mr. Wiley's
personal billing summary shows Allstate as a client of the Firm as early as 198 5 and
that the Wiley Firm billed Allstate $15,620.75 for legal services through September
1985.
(R. 7048.) This was not disclosed to plaintiffs.
(R. 4046.)
g.
Defendants' misstatements of the record concerning the
Allstate and CPL commitments are discussed at length in text, infra.
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Northstar/

focus, naturally and proximately flowed from defendants' initial
breaches.
In order to grant summary judgment, the lower court had to
decide that defendants' initial breaches of their position of trust
did not set in motion a series of events which allowed defendants
and their other clients to take unfair advantage of plaintiffs.
This determination could not be made without resolving numerous
factual disputes in favor of defendants.
Defendants also fail adequately to respond to the compelling
policy reasons supporting the standard of causation plaintiffs
advance.

In a case such as this which involves an attorney's

breach of fiduciary duties, the "but for" standard is incongruent
with the purpose of the remedy.

Even under the "reasonable

likelihood" standard defendants advance, plaintiffs have shown many
genuine issues of material fact concerning a better business
result.

Certainly, no other result could have been worse.

-3-

POINT I
CAUSATION2
A.

Required Level of Proof.

Defendants fail to recognize that the causation standard
applicable in breach of fiduciary duty cases is not the same as the
standard applicable in mere negligence cases.
duty is not carelessness.

Breach of fiduciary

It is intentional misconduct which the

law treats as equivalent to fraud.
Attorneys hold the most sensitive position of trust recognized
in the law. Attorney-client relations work best when the lawyer is
the client's most trusted confidant.

A client's remedy for a

breach of that trust must respond to accommodate the devastation
the breach causes.

One effect may well be impairment of the

client's ability to prove a better business result.

Courts there-

fore recognize that when the highest duties of trust are involved,
there must be a relaxed standard of causation.

When the attorney

self deals, appropriates a client opportunity for himself or for

defendants' claim that this point was raised for the first time on appeal is
wrong. In their Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, plaintiffs
advanced the standard by quoting at length from Spector v. Mermelstein. 361 F. Supp.
30 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), and the Second Circuit's affirmance at 485 F.2d 474 (2d Cir.
1973) . Plaintiffs there advanced the identical standard they advance here: "The
essential issue is whether the conduct of the defendant was a material element or
a substantial factor in bringing about the loss."
.Id. at 48 0-81
(emphasis
supplied). (R. 4023-26.) The issue was raised numerous times, stated in alternative
ways, opposed by defendants and ruled upon by the district court.
(R. 3365-67,
3937-39, 4007-08, 4016-29, 7142-57, 12725, 12729-30, 12736-39, 12740-53, 12754-55,
12763-67, 12783-84, 12786-88, 12803-05 and 12376-77.)

-4-

others, or advances the interests of one client to the detriment of
another, it is the attorney, not the client, who should bear the
risk of a deal gone bad or of uncertainty.

Highlands Ins. v.

National Union Fire Ins.. 27 F.3d 1027 (5th Cir. 1994)3;

Milbank.

Tweed. Hadley & McCloy v. Boon. 13 F.3d 537 (2d Cir. 1994); Spector
v. Mermelstein. 361 F. Supp. 30 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'dr 485 F.2d
474 (2d Cir. 1973).4
Contrary to defendants' claim, this standard has everything to
do with preserving the right of a client to trust his lawyer, and
nothing to do with the lawyer becoming guarantor of a venture.

If

this were a negligence case, defendants' argument might have merit.
Here, however, defendants engaged in intentional misconduct which
the law equates with actual fraud.

When the lawyer chooses to

3

In Highlands. National, a primary carrier, failed to disclose the full extent
of its coverage to Highlands, the excess carrier in breach of its fiduciary duty.
As a result, Highlands agreed to a settlement under the belief that its exposure was
greater than it actually was. Highlands testified it would have acted differently
had it been provided complete information.
While a risk of similar liability
existed, Highlands successfully argued that the risk was less than originally
thought due to National's failure to disclose in violation of its fiduciary duty.
(Likewise, plaintiffs here testified that with complete information, they would have
pursued a different course.) The Highlands court applied the "substantial factor"
standard but found sufficient evidence of causation under both standards. .Id. at
1031 (citing Milbank).
4

The situation is similar to that in an antitrust case in which the defendant's anticompetitive conduct makes it difficult to prove what business result
would have obtained absent the illegal conduct.
In such cases, the courts also
recognize that strict "but for" causation should not be required.
There, courts
"observe the practical limits of the burden of proof which may be demanded of a
treble-damage plaintiff who seeks recovery for injuries from a partial or total
exclusion from a market; damage issues in these cases are rarely susceptible of the
kind of concrete, detailed proof of injury which is available in other contexts."
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research. 395 U.S. 100, 123-24 (1969) .
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defraud his client, it is appropriate to charge him with all losses
which he substantially causes. Wiley, Rein & Fielding did not get
itself into this position by accident. All plaintiffs must show is
that the breach was a substantial factor in the outcome, and in the
present case there are genuine issues of material fact in this
regard.

Requiring more would shift the risks of lawyer dishonesty

from the lawyer to the client.5
B.

Material Disputed Facts Concerning Causation.

Defendants
breaches.
known

risk

refuse to recognize the seriousness of their

They treat their breaches as though plaintiffs took a
in a simple arms-length business deal

and lost.

5

Most of defendants' cases are inapposite. Stansbery v. Schroeder, 226 Neb.
492, 412 N.W.2d 447, 499-500 (1987), Williams v. Barber. 765 P.2d 887 (Utah 1988),
and Dunn, McKay, Burton, McMurray & Thurman, 584 P.2d 894 (Utah 1978) are
malpractice claims based on negligence. Mitchell v. Pierson Enterprises, 6 97 P.2d
24 0 (Utah 1985) is a wrongful death case based on negligence. Johnson v. Jones. 103
Idaho 702, 652 P. 2d 650 (Idaho 1982) , did not define the standard of proximate
cause. There, the trial court had found no attorney-client relationship, and thus
no duty.
Moreover, the plaintiff agreed the attorney had properly, fairly and
competently drafted the contract as contemplated by the parties, which the other
party had breached.
Finally, plaintiff produced no evidence that would have
satisfied either standard of causation. In Faucett v. American Resources Management
Corp., 542 F. Supp. 1234 (D. Utah 1982), (1) the case did not include an attorneyclient relationship, (2) defendant was not a fiduciary at the time of the alleged
breach, and (3) the court did not define proximate cause. Moreover, the court's
language supports the standard of causation plaintiffs advance: "Any action by a
corporate officer which diminishes the value of that asset would be a breach of
fiduciary duty for which the officer should be liable." Id. at 1241.
Yusefzadeh v. Ross, 932 F.2d 1262 (8th Cir. 1991) , supports an assertion that
a "but for" standard should apply in an attorney malpractice case based on breach
of fiduciary duty.
The facts, however, are easily distinguished.
There, the
attorney was not representing adverse interests, except his own.
Moreover,
plaintiff had no leads for financing a venture, and had been turned down by three
potential sources. The attorney also had not induced the client to turn down any
proposed commitments so he or another client would get the advantage. Finally, the
attorney had not aided and abetted his client's adversary in reducing or withdrawing
a commitment.

-6-

Defendants' argument suggests plaintiffs should never have relied
upon their lawyers' inducements and should have preserved other
options until the last minute.
By breaching their duty of full disclosure and informed
consent in June 1986, defendants deprived plaintiffs of the right
to make an informed decision concerning how the representation
would proceed.6

Here, Wiley and his Firm made the decision, with-

out their other clients' knowledge or consent, to represent Northstar/Allstate.

Had plaintiffs been given full disclosure, the

record is undisputed that defendants' representation of Northstar/
Allstate and plaintiffs would have ceased immediately.
lants' Brief, at 8.)

(Appel-

Plaintiffs would have known that the duty of

loyalty defendants owed them was in jeopardy, and would have taken
steps to protect themselves by seeking financing from other sources
and by securing other counsel.

(Id. at 5-8.)

The Wiley Firm in 1985 had given plaintiffs the assurance that
in the event of a conflict in representing two clients, the Firm
would withdraw from representing either client.

(Id. at 4.)

Even

as of the present, no such withdrawal, formal or informal, written

6

It remains undisputed that at no time leading up to or during the initial
breaches of defendants' duties of full disclosure and informed consent were
plaintiffs represented by other counsel. (Appellants' Brief, at 9-11.) Wood and
the Wiley Firm continued to represent plaintiffs in all matters relating to Channel
13. (Id.)

-7-

or oral, occurred respecting any of plaintiffs' interests.7 After
plaintiffs objected to defendants' request to represent Northstar/
Allstate, plaintiffs understood the adverse representation would
not occur, and had no reason to think defendants' duties of loyalty
and confidentiality to them were in jeopardy.

(id. at 5-8.)

The undisputed evidence is that Wood and the Wiley Firm
continued to represent plaintiffs throughout the summer and fall of
1986 and through the squeezedown.

(Id. at 8-15.) The Wiley Firm's

ongoing representation of plaintiffs was consistent with plaintiffs' understanding and belief that defendants would not represent
Northstar vis-a-vis plaintiffs' interests.

(Id.)

During the months of July through November 1986, plaintiffs
continued to look to and rely on Wood and the Wiley Firm to serve
as counsel for plaintiffs in all matters relating to Channel 13.
Mr. Wood's time entries relating to legal services performed for
plaintiffs show he had numerous discussions and meetings with
Northstar and CPL representatives and plaintiffs in the summer of
1986.

He

was

representing

plaintiffs

as

he

always had.

(Appellants' Brief, at 8-10.)

7

Surely, something as significant as withdrawal from representation after five
years, and representing a new client against the long-standing client, would merit
a confirmatory letter or at least a memo to the file. It simply has not happened.

-8-

Wood and the Wiley Firm represented and advised plaintiffs in
the selection of Northstar over CPL.

The record establishes,

unequivocally, that Wood, as plaintiffs7 attorney, induced plaintiffs to go with Northstar/Allstate based on their $10 million
commitment,

advised

them

to

reject

the

CPL

personally notified CPL of plaintiffs' decision.

commitment, and
(Id.)

Wood and the Wiley Firm negotiated the $5 million buy-outs of
the

other

resulted

applicants,
in

which,

plaintiffs'

without

personal

(Appellants' Brief, at 10-11.)8

plaintiffs' knowledge,

exposure

and

liability.

After plaintiffs learned at the

squeezedown of the substantial changes that had been made in
commitment, they also discovered for the first time that they were
personally and unconditionally liable for at least $1 million under
one of the settlement agreements negotiated and prepared by the
Wiley Firm on their behalf.

Wood was the only lawyer in contact

with the Utah clients during the squeezedown.
at pp. 13-15.)

(Appellants' Brief,

He informed them of the changes and their personal

exposure, and billed over 40 hours to plaintiffs during the
November 1986 squeezedown.

Why would Mr. Wood and the Wiley Firm negotiate agreements that exposed
plaintiffs to such liability if no commitment from Northstar/Allstate existed? See
discussion, infra at pp. 20-22, concerning Northstar/Allstate's commitment.

-9-

For the first time, during the squeezedown, plaintiffs learned
that defendants' duty of loyalty to them had been compromised.
(Appellants' Brief, at 12-15, 17.)

Defendants note in their brief

that Wiley, Rein & Fielding lawyers were sitting beside Northstar
and that Ralph Hardy sat with the plaintiffs.

They fail to note,

however, that Wiley, Rein & Fielding lawyer Wood represented plaintiffs in that same meeting and billed 40 hours to them for services
including the meeting during that three-day period.

(R. 5204,

6773-75.)
Defendants failed their duty affirmatively to protect plaintiffs7 interests and anticipate the very detrimental changes dictated by Northstar/Allstate.

Moreover, defendants had advised and

directed Northstar/Allstate in a manner which impaired plaintiffs'
interests.

This conduct directly violated both components of the

duty of loyalty (see infra, Point II) .

Both David Lee and Wood

objected to such conduct and reiterated that defendants owed
ethical duties to plaintiffs.

(Appellants' Brief at 13-14.)

Had defendants satisfied, rather than breached, these duties,
the outcome would clearly have been different.

(Id. at 8.)

Defen-

dants' breaches permitted Northstar/Allstate to withdraw the $10
million commitment, deny they had ever made it, and change the
terms of the transaction by, among other things, acquiring complete
control of the venture.

(Id. at 12-15.)
-10-

Defendants' breaches de-

prived plaintiffs the opportunity to obtain the benefit of their
bargain with Northstar.

(Id. at 18.)

Evidence establishes that

even with $8 million, plaintiffs could have bought out the other
applicants and placed the station in operation, and plaintiffs'
interest would today be valued at over $20 million.

(R. 6119-38.)

An additional factor defendants fail to address is the timesensitivity of the squeezedown in relation to

(1) plaintiffs'

discovery that defendants had breached the duty of loyalty to them,
(2) the requirement that partial payments of the multi-million
dollar buy outs of other applicants be funded immediately, (3)
plaintiffs'

discovery

that

the Wiley

Firm

had

exposed

them

personally and unconditionally on the agreements to buy out the
other applicants, and (4) the absence of any alternative financing.
What could plaintiffs do in such an emergency?

Defendants' prior

conduct had eliminated CPL and any other sources of funding from
the equation.

(Appellants' Brief at 10.)

Thus, Wood advised

plaintiffs they had no practical choice but to go forward with
Northstar to avoid the otherwise imminent personal exposure.
at 14.)
c.

Plaintiffs did so under extreme duress.

(Id.

(id. at 14-15.)

Ralph Hardy's Role and its Effect, if Any, Are
Disputed.

Defendants' analysis concerning the effect of Mr. Hardy's involvement is extremely superficial.
-11-

Defendants evaluate the seven

transactions,

out

of which plaintiffs' damages

occurred,

as

completely independent of each other, rather than inextricably
linked by the initial June 1986 breaches

(prior to any Hardy

involvement) and the repeated, ongoing breaches which compounded
the effects of the initial breaches.

The causal relationship

between the breaches and their effects is clearly a fact question.
Defendants' conclusion that plaintiffs had independent counsel
and advice during the critical events leading up to the squeezedown
is disputed.

Mr. Hardy was not involved in June of 1986, when

defendants' conflict of interest arose.
terminating the CPL financing commitment.

He was not involved in
He was not involved in

exposing plaintiffs to millions of dollars of personal liability.
One cannot reconcile the Wiley Firm's continuing representation of plaintiffs with defendants' conclusion that Hardy was
plaintiffs' lawyer at all critical stages. Defendants would have
been representing plaintiffs on the very matters on which Hardy
should also have been representing them.
protect

plaintiffs'

exclusive

If Hardy's role was to

interests

in

an

adversary

relationship, as defendants contend, how could he do so when
defendants were simultaneously serving as plaintiffs' lawyer and
representative of their adversary?
Moreover, Hardy's hind-sight explanation concerning his role
is clearly different from both plaintiffs' understanding and the
-12-

evidence.

Plaintiffs were never advised that Hardy was their

lawyer vis-a-vis Northstar/Allstate.

There is no evidence that any

of the plaintiffs ever entertained the thought of engaging him as
their lawyer prior to the squeezedown, engaged him as their lawyer
or were informed Hardy thought he was their lawyer before the
squeezedown.

Mr. Hardy never counseled with the Utah plaintiffs.

They never counseled with him.

All plaintiffs believed he was

financial advisor to the Foulgers.9

(Appellants7 Brief at 10-11.)

It is undisputed that Hardy never advised plaintiffs concerning
defendants' conflicts.

(Id.)

Only when it became apparent to the Foulgers that defendants
had subjected them and the other plaintiffs to personal liabilities
in excess of $1 million did the Foulger family ask Hardy to assume
the role of legal counsel to protect the interests of Foulger.
5186-94, 5167; Appellants' Brief, at 10-11.)
defendants

Thus, to the extent

claim Mr. Hardy was plaintiffs' attorney

9

(R.

for all

In Breuer-Harrison, Inc. v. Combe, 799 P.2d 716, 727 (Utah App. 1990), the
court stated a showing of an attorney-client relationship "is subjective in that a
factor in evaluating the relationship is whether the client thought an attorneyclient relationship existed." The court further observed "it is the intent and
conduct of the parties which is critical to the formation of the attorney-client
relationship." ( Id. at 728.) Similarly, in Glover v. Libman. 578 F. Supp. 748, 757
(N.D. Ga. 1983), the court stated that in determining whether an attorney-client
relationship exists, the focus must be on the subjective expectations of the client.
In other words, the relationship "hinges upon the client's belief that he is
consulting a lawyer in that capacity and his manifested intention to seek
professional legal advice." Accord, Green v. Montgomery County, 784 F. Supp. 841,
845 (M.D. Ala. 1992) .

-13-

purposes in plaintiffs' dealings with Northstar/Allstate, there is
a genuine issue of material fact.
Finally, even if Hardy did represent the plaintiffs, the
record establishes that defendants obtained client information
concerning plaintiffs' financial condition, personalities, employment, goals, strategies, and business practices, which was not
available to other parties with whom plaintiffs did business.
(Appellant's Brief, at 46-49.)

While some information was publicly

available from the FCC, defendants knew much more about plaintiffs
than could have been discerned from review of a public record, and
their personal knowledge of the plaintiffs meant they knew how to
exploit the information they had.

Knowing plaintiffs' vulner-

abilities gave Northstar/Allstate leverage and the ability to
exploit plaintiffs' and their business opportunity.

The extent and

egregiousness of defendants' breaches strongly imply the misuse of
that confidential information.

It is inconceivable that defendants

would not have used the information for their own benefit and that
of their other clients.

The alleged involvement of other counsel

does not relieve Wiley, Rein & Fielding of its duty to maintain
plaintiffs' confidences and not to use those confidences against
them.

It also did not relieve Wiley, Rein & Fielding of the duty

of loyalty affirmatively to protect, which it clearly breached.

-14-

POINT II
DUTIES OWED AND BREACHED
Although admitting for purposes of this motion that they had
a conflict of interest, defendants spend substantial time in their
brief attempting to deny or at least justify their misconduct.
Defendants owed plaintiffs the following duties:
First, they owed a duty of full disclosure and informed consent concerning any adverse representation.10

Defendants concede

at page 5 of their Brief a factual dispute concerning breach of
their duty of full disclosure and informed consent on their decision to represent Northstar/Allstate against plaintiffs.
cision occurred at least by June 11, 1986.

This de-

(See supra footnote 1.)

Second, defendants owed plaintiffs a duty of loyalty. Because
defendants breached their duty of full disclosure and informed
consent, they could never have obtained an informed and valid
consent to the adverse representation. Defendants' duty of loyalty

10

In Stansbury v. Schroeder. 226 Neb. 492, 412 N.W.2d 447, 499 (1987) (quoting
Ishmael v. Millington. 241 Cal. App. 2d 520, 50 Cal Rptr. 592, 595-96 (1966)), cited
by defendants, the court explained:
The loyalty he owes one client cannot consume that owed to the other.
Most descriptions of professional conduct prohibit his undertaking to
represent conflicting interests at all; or demand that he terminate the
three-way relationship when adversity of interest appears. Occasional
statements sanction informed representation of divergent interest in
"exceptional" situations.
Even those statements demand complete
disclosure of all facts and circumstances which, in the attorney's
honest judgment, may influence the client's choice, holding the
attorney civilly liable for loss caused by lack of disclosure.

-15-

to plaintiffs, arising from years of legal representation, thus
remained intact and unchanged.
The duty of loyalty had two components.

The first component

was an affirmative duty to protect plaintiffs7

interests and

anticipate the adverse and detrimental plans of others (including
Northstar/Allstate).

The second component was a duty not to advise

or direct any persons with whom plaintiffs transacted business in
a manner which would or could impair plaintiffs7 interests. After
defendants failed to obtain consent to represent Northstar vis-avis plaintiffs, defendants admittedly were loyal to Northstar/
Allstate and disloyal to plaintiffs.

Clearly, defendants7 failure

to affirmatively protect plaintiffs7 interests and defendants7
representation of Northstar/Allstate against plaintiffs breached
both components of the loyalty duty.
Third, defendants owed plaintiffs the separate duty of confidentiality.

That duty strictly prohibited the use of any confid-

ential information obtained during the representation for the
benefit of defendants or their other clients. There is no conceivable way that defendants could represent both Northstar and the
plaintiffs in the same transaction without breaching this duty.
A.

Consequences of the Breaches of Duties of Loyalty.

Defendants7 conclusion that it was Northstar/Allstate7s conduct, and not theirs, which caused plaintiffs7 damages, is incor-16-

rect. Defendants mistakenly argue they are not responsible for any
damages caused by the predatory business decisions of their other
clients.

They imply that the business world is a war, it's risky,

and one who enters the fray must be prepared to accept losses. One
risk plaintiffs did not assume, nor were they required to under the
rules of engagement, however, was that their own lawyers would
defect, and would assist their adversary to defeat plaintiffs while
preserving a facade of continuing to protect plaintiffs' interests
as always before. The problem with defendants' conclusion is that
defendants

owed

plaintiffs

the

dual

duty

of

loyalty--the

affirmative duty to protect and anticipate, and the duty not to
assist another client in a manner which impaired plaintiffs'
interests. The law, defendants' concessions and the undisputed
evidence establish these duties.
Defendants cite two cases, Purdy v. Pacific Auto. Ins. Co.,
157 Cal. App. 3d 59, 203 Cal. Rptr. 524 (1984), and Franko v.
Mitchell. 158 Ariz. 391, 762 P.2d 1345 (Ariz. App. 1988), for the
proposition that they are not liable for the conduct of their
clients.

These cases, and defendants' argument, miss the point.

Plaintiffs do not attempt to hold defendants liable for the conduct
of their clients.

Rather defendants' conduct in breaching their

duty of loyalty left plaintiffs exposed and permitted defendants
and their other clients to take unfair advantage of plaintiffs.
-17-

Purdy makes this very point by contrasting the facts of a more
analogous case.

In Purdy plaintiff claimed the attorney had

negligently failed to persuade his insurer to settle a claim within
policy limits.

There was no allegation of a breach of the

attorney's duty of loyalty to the insured, only that the lawyer had
negligently failed to "effectuate settlement."

Most significantly,

however, u[t]here were no allegations in the . . . cause of action
against the lawyer defendants of conspiracy or of the commission of
any intentional torts."

By contrast, the Purdy court cited Betts

v. Allstate Ins. Co.r 154 Cal. App. 3d 688, 201 Cal. Rptr. 528,
535-36 (1984):
In Betts, it was found that "The lawyers failed Betts by
(1) lack of disclosure and sound advice; (2) after the
excess verdict, when the conflict of interest was
unmistakeable, actively working to protect Allstate and
persisting in manipulating Betts against her own best
interests; (3) assisting in manufacturing a false record
against the time when a bad faith lawsuit might be
instituted; (4) rather than advising consultation of
independent counsel as possible or desirable, resisting
the efforts of such counsel to become informed when
finally retained; (5) discouraging Betts' assignment of
rights in exchange for personal release and influencing
her instead in the direction of bankrupty."
(Emphasis supplied.)

In Bettsr there was an unmistakeable breach

of the duty of loyalty in protecting the interests of Allstate over
and against the interests of Betts.

Defendants' conduct here in

protecting the interests of Northstar over and against the interests of plaintiffs creates the identical causal relationship.
-18-

Franko is similarly distinguishable.

There, the court found

no cause of action by a non-client could be maintained absent a
duty, such as xxa unique fiduciary relationship."

762 P.2d at 1354.

Such a relationship clearly existed here.
Plaintiffs have established, and defendants have not denied,
that defendants, as lawyers for Northstar/Allstate, advised these
clients on the very matters at issue prior to the clients' taking
any course of action.11

As a director of Northstar and Farragut,

Wiley voted in favor of each specific action directed against
plaintiffs, and the defendants represented Northstar/Allstate in
implementing those decisions. Yet, defendants owed plaintiffs the
affirmative duty to protect plaintiffs' interests, and to challenge
any act or decision of Northstar/Allstate which, in any way,
conflicted with or impaired plaintiffs' interests.12
As the lawyer for Northstar/Allstate and as director of
Northstar and Farragut, Wiley and his Firm were in a position to
influence decisions consistent with plaintiffs' interests, even if

The Wiley Firm's time records are telling. At each critical juncture, the
Wiley Firm researched and advised these other clients before the clients followed
the suggested course of action, which in every instance injured plaintiffs.
(Appellants' Brief, at 12-23.)
12

Indeed, after the squeezedown, defendants' ongoing duties of full disclosure
informed consent, loyalty, and confidentiality to the plaintiffs arose due also to
plaintiffs' status as limited partners of MWT, Ltd. Margulies v. Upchurch, 6 96 P.2d
1195 (Utah 1985). Defendants' adverse representation of Northstar and MWT, Ltd.
against plaintiffs' interests following the squeezedown (Appellants' brief at 15-23)
clearly breached these duties, which further assured defendants' losses.
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they were adverse to the interests of Northstar/Allstate.

He never

spoke in defense of plaintiffs' interests, however, while he was
advocating

the

interests

of Northstar/Allstate.

Rather, he

directly assisted these clients to undermine plaintiffs7 interests.
He then obtained indemnity from Allstate to protect him and his
Firm against their own breaches of their duties to plaintiffs.
By being in both camps and representing conflicting interests,
Mr. Wiley was forced to choose between which clients he would
protect and which he would forsake, because the nature of the
transaction prevented him from protecting both.

He opted to pro-

tect the wealthier and more prestigious clients whom he represented, on whose boards he sat and in whom he held a financial
stake.
B.

Additional Consequences of Defendants' Breaches of
Fiduciary Duty,

The further consequences of defendants' conduct are not as
defendants

represent.

The evidence clearly establishes that

defendants' conduct was a substantial factor in their losses, and
that but for defendants' conduct, there would have been a better
result.
(1) NORTHSTAR COMMITMENT:
of $10 million.

Northstar made a commitment

Without a commitment from Northstar, plaintiffs

never would have accepted Wood's advice
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to turn down CPL's

commitment.

Joe Lee, David Lee, Clayton Foulger, and Jo-Ann Wong

Kilpatrick testified that Northstar had committed $10 million based
on the representations of Wood, their attorney. (R. 4969, 4972-73,
4985, 5049-51, 5102-04, 5115, 5203-04, 5245-46; £££ Appellants'
Brief, at 8-10.)
It was Wood who advised plaintiffs to accept Northstar's $10
million commitment and reject the CPL commitment.

He advised

plaintiffs that Northstar had committed $10 million, and he was the
one who telephoned CPL to say that plaintiffs would go with
Northstar/Allstate.13

(Appellants' Brief, at 11.) The record shows

that during the squeezedown, Mr. Wood was angered that over $3
million of the commitment had "vanished."

(Id. at 8-15.)

In

response to accusations that he had been disloyal to Northstar in
attempting to ameliorate the obvious damage the adverse representations caused plaintiffs during the squeezedown, Wood stated:
Certainly my consultation with the Mountain West principals on the subject of our representation of Northstar
did not include a warning that we would operate in an
unprofessional fashion on behalf of Northstar in order to
gain an advantage for Northstar over Mountain W e s t . . . .

If, in fact, Wood's representations and inducements concerning the
Northstar commitment had been untrue, such a misrepresentation clearly would have
caused plaintiffs substantial injury. They rejected the CPL commitment based on
that representation. Having effectively taken away any opportunity for
plaintiffs to accept that commitment, defendants now contend there never was such
an opportunity. There is, at the very least, a genuine issue of material fact in
this regard.
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Finally, your January 9 memorandum raises the question of
my comments at approximately 3 a.m. on November 15 on the
subject of the $3,000,000 that had vanished from the
draft Partnership Agreement and Credit Agreement shortly
before. Without belaboring the matter, it is obvious
that everyone was tired and tempers were short. . . .
Moreover, the problem was of a magnitude that it was
producing a complete break-down of trust in Northstar and
WR&F.
It was not in the interest of the firm or
Northstar to take clearly untenable positions as to the
representations that had been made to induce the
[plaintiffs] to negotiate with Northstar at that level,
or the fact that the prior documents reflected those
representations. Nor do I aspire to practice law on the
hidden ball technique of negotiations, particularly when
it is used in as sensitive a situation as this one.
(R. 6464, 6471.)

There is at least a genuine issue of material

fact whether, had defendants not breached their duties, plaintiffs
could have enforced the commitment against Northstar.
(2)
lion.

CPL COMMITMENT:

CPL made a commitment of $11 mil-

(Appellants7 Brief at 9.)

CPL's experience in the telecom-

munications industry dwarfed that of Northstar.

(R. 7056.)

CPL

was an experienced and sophisticated company owning five television
properties.

As Wood explained in a July 14, 1986 letter to

plaintiffs, some time before CPL made its commitment:
The Dallas people [CPL] are very interested.
Their
broadcaster investor has 5 TV stations already, with
independent station (as opposed to network) experience in
2 of them. One of his U.H.F. independents makes more
money than at least one of the affiliates.
(Id.; Appellants7 Brief, at 8-10.)
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The terms of CPL's later commitment, which were memorialized
in CPL's "Memorandum of Understanding/7 showed that CPL had committed to put up financing of $11 million.

(R. 7065-94.)

Based on

CPL's representations of what it could and would do, CPL's managing
partner explained:
You will notice that we have designed a $10 million
financing arrangement that will provide all of the money
that we project is necessary for this venture, plus
another $1 million of a contingency reserve. Of this
financing, the Mountain West Principals would be required
to convert their existing investment into preferred stock
of the continuing company, plus perhaps a nominal amount
in common stock.
Communications Partners would be
responsible for arranging all the rest of the financing.
(R. 7091.)14

Based on Wood's representations concerning CPL's

financial strength, there is no doubt CPL could have performed
under its commitment. Had plaintiffs been given the right to make
an informed decision to go with CPL or with another financing
source, the record shows at least a genuine issue of material fact
on the reasonable likelihood that plaintiffs would have been able
to buy out the other applicants, obtain the license, put the

14

Defendants assert that CPL's "proposal" was for $2 million not $10 million.
(Appellees' Brief, at 12.) Defendants' claim in this regard is one of their more
outrageous distortions of the record. Defendants are careful to state that CPL had
committed only $2 million of its own money, which, defendants claim, would never
have closed the deal with competing applicants. What defendants fail to disclose,
however, is that CPL was prepared to finance the remainder of its commitment. The
implication is that somehow CPL's money would not have worked as well as Northstar's
in obtaining the Channel 13 license and in putting the station in operation.
As it turned out, a significant portion of the reduced Northstar/Allstate
commitment was financed by notes to buy out competing applicants.
See, e.g. .
Defendants' Addendum, Exhibits 13 and 14.
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station into operation and realize an interest valued at over $20
million in the station.

(R. 6119; Appellants' Brief, at 23-24, 37-

39)15
CONCLUSION
The trial court's summary judgment

is inconsistent with

plaintiffs' right to have all facts and inferences drawn in their
favor.

Plaintiffs were entitled to submit these claims to a finder

of fact.

For these reasons, the trial court's order of summary

judgment must be reversed, and the case remanded for trial.
DATED this

day of June, 1995.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

Reec
Gordon R. Hall
Rex E. Madsen
Richard A. Van Wagoner
Attorneys for Appellants

15

CPL's commitment was no more viable than Northstar's only if defendants
falsely assume that CPL would somehow have taken the same unfair advantage of
plaintiffs. There is no evidence to this effect. Plaintiffs' clearly would have
been much better off by accepting CPL's commitment.
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